When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on 9 January 2005, it ended one of Africa’s longest-running civil wars and opened the way for South Sudan’s self-determination. Six years later, on 9 July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan became an independent country.
The years between the CPA and independence offered an extraordinary opportunity to build a new state. International partners, particularly the United States, supported the peace process and contributed diplomatic, financial, technical, and security assistance. Development agencies and international contractors helped establish ministries, strengthen public financial management, support security-sector reform, and prepare the new government for independence.
Yet the country entered a devastating civil war in December 2013, barely thirty months after independence.
What happened? Why did years of international assistance, technical training, institutional planning, and financial support fail to produce a state capable of managing its internal political disagreements peacefully?
One important explanation lies in the difference between constructing the appearance of a modern state and developing the political legitimacy, domestic capacity, and public accountability that allow a state to function.
South Sudan’s experience reveals the limitations of externally designed state-building when political settlements, local power relations, and domestic ownership receive insufficient attention. The United States did not create every weakness that contributed to the crisis, and South Sudanese leaders retain primary responsibility for their political decisions. Nevertheless, Washington and other international partners must also examine the assumptions behind their assistance.
Key Takeaways
- The CPA created a pathway to independence, but it did not automatically establish the foundations of a stable and accountable state.
- International assistance helped establish government structures, but many programmes struggled to develop lasting domestic capacity.
- The 2006 Juba Declaration integrated rival armed groups into the SPLA, reducing immediate threats while creating serious long-term security-sector challenges.
- The international priority of securing the 2011 referendum often competed with demands for political accountability and institutional reform.
- Weak public administration, fragmented donor programmes, and reliance on external technical assistance limited the development of local institutional capacity.
- The December 2013 conflict exposed unresolved political and military divisions that had survived the transition to independence.
- Sustainable state-building requires domestic ownership, inclusive political institutions, civilian security services, and accountability from the beginning.
TL;DR
South Sudan’s state-building experience between 2005 and 2011 demonstrates that foreign funding, consultants, policy documents, and administrative systems cannot independently create a functioning nation. International partners helped establish government institutions, but political patronage, unresolved military loyalties, weak public administration, and limited accountability undermined their effectiveness. The lesson is not that international assistance is unnecessary. It is that assistance must strengthen domestic institutions rather than substitute for them.

1. The CPA Created an Opportunity, Not a Finished State
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was a historic political settlement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). It established arrangements for power-sharing, wealth-sharing, security, and a referendum on self-determination for Southern Sudan.
The agreement provided a political and legal pathway toward independence. However, it did not provide a ready-made administration capable of governing a new country.
Southern Sudan entered the interim period with limited infrastructure, weak public services, inadequate administrative systems, and a shortage of trained personnel. The emerging Government of Southern Sudan had to establish ministries, manage oil revenues, coordinate security institutions, and prepare for a possible independent future while still operating within the CPA’s political arrangements.
The United States played a major diplomatic role in supporting the CPA and South Sudan’s independence. It also became one of the country’s most important bilateral aid partners. Other governments, international organisations, and development agencies contributed to the state-building effort.
The ambition was considerable: help establish institutions capable of managing public finances, delivering services, maintaining security, and preparing the population for democratic self-government.
However, a new government cannot become effective simply because ministries have been established and official documents have been written. Institutions require capable personnel, public trust, political agreement, and the ability to enforce rules consistently.
The distinction between establishing institutions and making them function would become one of South Sudan’s most persistent challenges.
2. The Technocratic Approach to State-Building
Much of the international state-building effort relied on technical assistance. Consultants and development specialists helped prepare legislation, design administrative procedures, advise ministries, support financial management, and establish government systems.
These activities were not inherently misguided. A government emerging from decades of war needed technical expertise. It required accountants, economists, lawyers, engineers, public administrators, security planners, and trained civil servants.
The problem was the assumption that importing technical solutions could produce institutional effectiveness without sufficient attention to the political and administrative conditions required to sustain them.
A policy document may describe how a ministry should operate, but it cannot guarantee that the ministry has competent staff, adequate funding, or political independence. An electronic financial system may improve recordkeeping, but it cannot prevent corruption when powerful officials can disregard procedures without consequences.
This problem was examined by Greg Larson, Peter Biar Ajak, and Lant Pritchett in their 2013 study, South Sudan’s Capability Trap: Building a State with Disruptive Innovation. The researchers argued that international capacity-building efforts had helped the government acquire the outward appearance of a modern state without producing equivalent improvements in its ability to perform essential public functions.
Their analysis described a country receiving extensive technical assistance while struggling to convert training, workshops, foreign advisers, and institutional reforms into lasting domestic capability.
The lesson is important: technical assistance should not be measured mainly by the number of consultants deployed, workshops conducted, policies drafted, or systems installed. It should be measured by whether national institutions can perform their responsibilities independently and effectively after external support decreases.
3. Security Sector Reform and the Political Cost of Integration
Security-sector reform was among the most difficult challenges during the CPA interim period.
The Sudan People’s Liberation Army had developed as a guerrilla movement during the liberation struggle. Transforming it into a professional national military required more than training soldiers. It required unified command structures, clear responsibilities, accountable leadership, civilian oversight, effective logistics, and a shared understanding of national service.
The United States supported efforts to improve the SPLA’s organisation and professional capacity. American policy discussions during the period included military restructuring, force planning, training, and security-sector reform. DynCorp International was among the contractors associated with efforts to support the transformation of the SPLA.
However, the security arrangements of the interim period were shaped by political realities that technical reform programmes could not easily resolve.
The SPLA was not the only armed force operating in Southern Sudan. Several rival armed groups had developed during the civil war, some with support from Khartoum. Their continued existence presented a serious threat to the stability of the emerging government.
President Salva Kiir’s government therefore pursued the integration of rival forces rather than attempting to defeat all of them militarily.
This approach reached an important milestone through the Juba Declaration of 8 January 2006, an agreement between the SPLA and the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF). The declaration committed the two forces to unity and integration under the SPLA.
The agreement reduced the immediate threat posed by several armed groups. It also helped consolidate the political and military position of the Southern government during a sensitive period.
However, integration did not automatically create a unified national army. Former rival commanders and their forces entered the military with different loyalties, political expectations, and chains of personal influence.
Research on the CPA security arrangements has described the Juba Declaration as both a security agreement and a political bargain involving the distribution of patronage. The agreement helped contain immediate conflict, but it also contributed to an enlarged military structure whose payroll and internal cohesion became difficult to manage.
This exposed a fundamental contradiction. International reform programmes promoted professionalisation, expenditure control, and institutional discipline, while domestic political calculations encouraged the accommodation of armed leaders and their followers.
A military force cannot become a unified national institution merely by placing rival groups on the same payroll. Integration requires a shared command structure, professional standards, civilian oversight, and confidence that political disagreements will not determine military allegiance.
4. The Political Priority of the 2011 Referendum
The international community’s support for South Sudan’s self-determination referendum was central to the CPA process.
The referendum, held in January 2011, represented the culmination of a long struggle for political recognition and self-government. Its successful completion was a major diplomatic achievement.
However, the intense focus on securing the referendum created a difficult political environment for institutional accountability.
The CPA implementation process required cooperation between political actors whose relationship had been shaped by decades of conflict. Maintaining the peace agreement and ensuring that the referendum took place were major priorities for international diplomats.
At the same time, concerns about corruption, governance, human rights, and political inclusion continued to emerge.
The African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan later examined weaknesses in the CPA and its implementation. Its report identified the international community’s concentration on ending the North-South conflict as one reason that questions of democracy, accountability, and structural political reform received insufficient attention.
The Commission also discussed how accountability and reconciliation had been excluded from important parts of the peace process because political leaders feared the consequences of pursuing them.
This does not mean that every American official ignored corruption or human rights abuses. Nor does it establish that Washington deliberately encouraged impunity. It does, however, raise an important policy question: did the international priority of securing independence receive greater attention than the development of institutions capable of holding political and military leaders accountable?
A successful referendum could establish a country’s legal independence. It could not guarantee democratic political competition, responsible public administration, or the peaceful transfer of power.
Independence was a historic achievement, but it was also the beginning of a much larger responsibility.
5. Corruption and the Dura Grain Procurement Scandal
The Dura grain procurement scandal became one of the most widely discussed examples of corruption during the interim period.
In 2008, the Government of Southern Sudan initiated a major grain procurement and distribution programme intended to respond to food shortages. The programme was valued at approximately two billion Sudanese pounds, reported at the time as roughly US$800 million.
More than 700 companies were reportedly contracted to supply and distribute grain. Subsequent investigations raised serious concerns about fictitious companies, questionable contracts, and grain that never reached its intended destinations.
In 2011, government officials publicly acknowledged the scale of the alleged fraud and discussed efforts to investigate and prosecute those involved.
The scandal demonstrated the danger of managing large public budgets without sufficiently strong procurement systems, independent oversight, reliable records, and effective enforcement.
It also illustrated why technical reforms alone cannot prevent corruption. A procurement manual may establish the correct procedure, but it cannot guarantee that officials follow it. An accounting system may record transactions, but it cannot independently prosecute those responsible for fraudulent contracts.
The Dura case should therefore be understood as more than a financial scandal. It was a warning about the institutional weaknesses facing the emerging government.
A state that cannot reliably protect public resources will struggle to finance roads, schools, hospitals, agricultural programmes, and other essential services.
The issue was not simply whether international advisers had prepared the correct financial procedures. It was whether the political leadership and public institutions were willing and able to enforce them.
6. Foreign Technical Assistance and the Problem of Capacity Substitution
One of the most significant weaknesses in South Sudan’s state-building experience was the reliance on external organisations to perform functions that national institutions were expected to manage in the future.
International agencies and contractors provided technical assistance across government ministries and public-service programmes. Their involvement helped keep important activities moving despite the limited capacity of the new administration.
However, the distinction between capacity-building and capacity substitution became increasingly important.
Capacity-building means helping national institutions acquire the skills, systems, personnel, and experience needed to perform their responsibilities independently.
Capacity substitution occurs when external organisations repeatedly perform those responsibilities on behalf of domestic institutions without creating a sustainable transfer of knowledge and authority.
The two approaches may produce similar short-term results. A foreign consultant may prepare a budget, a contractor may manage a project, and an international organisation may deliver a public service. Yet these activities do not necessarily improve the government’s ability to repeat the work independently.
The World Bank’s later review of public-sector capacity development in South Sudan examined the period from 2005 to 2016. It identified several problems, including fragmented assistance, short-term support cycles, limited government capacity, and hiring decisions influenced by patronage and loyalty.
The review also noted the tension between maintaining a political settlement and developing a public service based on merit, effectiveness, and efficiency.
This tension was particularly difficult because public employment served political and social purposes in a country emerging from war. Government positions could help accommodate powerful groups and maintain political alliances, but they could also weaken merit-based recruitment and administrative performance.
The result was a government whose institutional structures expanded faster than its ability to perform many of its responsibilities.
Foreign assistance was necessary, but it needed to create lasting domestic capability rather than permanent dependence on external expertise.
7. Civilian Policing and the Neglect of Everyday Justice
State-building is not only about the military. Citizens also need reliable police services, accessible courts, and institutions capable of resolving disputes peacefully.
During the CPA period, security-sector reform operated within a difficult environment. The SPLA remained central to the security arrangements, while civilian policing and judicial institutions faced serious resource and capacity constraints.
The South Sudan Police Service needed trained personnel, professional leadership, investigative capacity, equipment, and clear civilian oversight. The justice system also required qualified judges, prosecutors, lawyers, court facilities, and procedures that citizens could trust.
The problem was not simply the absence of formal institutions. It was the difficulty of making those institutions independent, accessible, and effective.
Military personnel and civilian police officers perform different responsibilities. A soldier is trained primarily for military duties, while a police officer must understand civilian law enforcement, public protection, investigation, restraint, and the rights of citizens.
When the distinction between military authority and civilian policing becomes weak, citizens may experience the state primarily through coercive institutions rather than through reliable public services and legal protection.
A functioning state must be capable of protecting national sovereignty while also protecting individuals within its borders.
The development of professional civilian policing and an accessible justice system should therefore have received sustained attention alongside military reform.
8. December 2013: When the Institutional Weaknesses Became Visible
On 15 December 2013, fighting broke out in Juba following escalating political tensions within the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement.
The confrontation began among members of the Presidential Guard and quickly spread to other military units and civilian areas. Within days, the national army had divided between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and forces aligned with former Vice-President Riek Machar.
The conflict developed an ethnic dimension and spread beyond the capital, producing widespread civilian suffering, displacement, and destruction.
The African Union, United Nations, and other organisations documented the political and military developments surrounding the outbreak of violence. The International Crisis Group also examined how unresolved divisions within the SPLM and SPLA contributed to the crisis.
The December 2013 conflict exposed the limitations of the security-sector transformation undertaken during the interim period. The army had not become a sufficiently integrated national institution capable of remaining cohesive during a major political dispute.
However, it would be inaccurate to claim that foreign military training or technical assistance alone caused the civil war. The crisis had deep domestic roots, including unresolved leadership disputes, competition over political authority, personal rivalries, weak party institutions, and the militarisation of political disagreements.
The central lesson is that military professionalisation cannot be separated from political reform. A national army requires a political system in which disputes can be resolved through legitimate institutions rather than armed confrontation.
The institutions built during the CPA period had not adequately addressed that requirement.
9. What Washington and Other International Partners Could Have Done Differently
The experience of South Sudan does not prove that international assistance is useless. It demonstrates that the design and delivery of assistance matter.
First, international partners needed to place greater emphasis on domestic institutional ownership. Technical advisers could provide expertise, but their work should have been tied to measurable knowledge transfer, national staffing plans, and the gradual assumption of responsibility by South Sudanese institutions.
Second, security-sector reform needed to address the political and organisational consequences of integrating armed groups. Bringing rival forces together could reduce immediate violence, but integration also required unified command, professional standards, civilian oversight, and credible mechanisms for resolving internal disputes.
Third, the international community needed to treat accountability as part of peacebuilding rather than as a task to be postponed until after independence. Corruption, human rights abuses, and exclusionary political practices could weaken the institutions that the international community was helping to establish.
Fourth, more sustained investment was needed in civilian policing, courts, local government, public financial management, and essential services. A government cannot establish public legitimacy through military institutions alone.
Finally, assistance needed to be coordinated around practical national priorities. The number of projects, consultants, and policy documents was less important than the government’s ability to maintain public services, manage public revenue, enforce laws, and respond to citizens’ needs.
These lessons apply beyond Washington. The United Nations, the African Union, European governments, international financial institutions, and other development partners must also examine how their programmes affect domestic institutions.
International partners cannot demand national ownership while designing and implementing most of the work themselves.
10. The Lessons for South Sudan’s Future
South Sudan’s experience between 2005 and 2011 should remain an important lesson for the country’s present and future generations.
The first lesson is that political independence and institutional independence are not the same achievement. A country may acquire international recognition, a national flag, a constitution, and government ministries while still struggling to exercise effective authority and provide reliable public services.
The second lesson is that political inclusion must extend beyond the distribution of government positions and military ranks. Sustainable inclusion requires credible political parties, functioning legislatures, independent civic organisations, local participation, and institutions that protect citizens regardless of political or ethnic affiliation.
The third lesson is that public institutions must serve the population rather than become instruments for maintaining elite agreements. Public employment, national revenue, security services, and government contracts should be managed according to clear laws and public responsibilities.
The fourth lesson is that international assistance must strengthen the ability of South Sudanese institutions to function without permanent external management. Foreign expertise can be valuable, but it should support the development of national expertise rather than replace it.
For South Sudan, the practical priorities remain clear: professional public administration, accountable security institutions, independent courts, reliable financial management, agricultural development, education, healthcare, infrastructure, electricity, and employment.
The country also needs a political culture in which disagreement does not automatically become a security threat.
Washington’s experience in South Sudan illustrates the limitations of treating state-building primarily as a technical exercise. The United States and other partners helped create important institutions, but institutional design could not resolve the political disagreements and power struggles that threatened the new state.
The responsibility for building a functioning South Sudan ultimately belongs to South Sudanese citizens and leaders. International partners can provide support, expertise, and resources, but they cannot manufacture domestic legitimacy.
A nation cannot be built on paper alone. It must be built through public trust, political responsibility, capable institutions, and the consistent application of the law.
Reflection Questions
- Did international partners place enough emphasis on domestic political accountability during the CPA interim period?
- How could the 2006 Juba Declaration have been followed by stronger military integration and civilian oversight?
- What should South Sudan have done differently to turn foreign technical assistance into lasting national capacity?
- How can the country strengthen civilian policing and judicial institutions alongside its national military?
- What should future international development programmes measure to determine whether they are strengthening South Sudanese institutions?
Frequently Asked Questions
1. What was the main weakness of state-building in South Sudan between 2005 and 2011?
A major weakness was the gap between establishing formal government structures and developing the domestic capacity, political accountability, and institutional legitimacy needed to make them function effectively.
2. What role did the United States play in South Sudan’s state-building process?
The United States played a major diplomatic role in supporting the CPA and South Sudan’s independence. It also provided substantial bilateral assistance, including support for governance, security-sector reform, and institutional development. Other international partners also contributed to these efforts.
3. What was the Juba Declaration of 2006?
The Juba Declaration, signed on 8 January 2006, was an agreement between the SPLA and the South Sudan Defence Forces. It committed the two forces to unity and integration under the SPLA, helping reduce the immediate threat posed by several rival armed groups.
4. What was the Dura grain procurement scandal?
The Dura scandal involved a major grain procurement and distribution programme initiated in 2008 to address food shortages in Southern Sudan. Investigations and subsequent public statements raised serious allegations of fraudulent companies, questionable contracts, and public funds lost through corruption.
5. What can South Sudan learn from the CPA-era state-building experience?
South Sudan can learn that government institutions require more than foreign funding and technical assistance. They need capable national personnel, accountable leadership, inclusive political arrangements, civilian oversight, and the ability to provide services independently.
Conclusion
South Sudan’s transition from the CPA to independence was one of the most important political developments in modern African history. It demonstrated what international diplomacy, national liberation movements, and popular self-determination could achieve. However, it also exposed the limitations of building government institutions without resolving the political and organisational problems that determine whether those institutions can function.
The United States and other international partners contributed important resources and expertise, but their technical programmes could not substitute for domestic political agreement, accountability, and institutional ownership. South Sudanese leaders also failed to turn the opportunity created by independence into a stable system of public governance.
The lesson is not to reject international assistance. It is to make assistance serve the development of institutions that belong to the people and can function without permanent external management.
South Sudan needs more than government buildings, policy documents, military payroll systems, and administrative plans. It needs institutions that protect citizens, manage public resources responsibly, resolve disputes peacefully, and hold those in authority accountable.
A state is not built when its institutions exist on paper. It is built when those institutions work for the people.
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Sources and Further Reading
- Larson, G., Ajak, P. B., & Pritchett, L. (2013). South Sudan’s Capability Trap: Building a State with Disruptive Innovation. Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series.
- World Bank. (2017). South Sudan Governance Analysis: Capacity Building and Public Sector Development. World Bank.
- United Nations Peacemaker. (2006). Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the SPLA and the SSDF. 8 January 2006.
- African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan. (2015). Final Report. African Union.
- United States Congressional Research Service. (2016). Conflict in South Sudan and the Challenges Ahead. Congressional Research Service.
- International Crisis Group. (2014). South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name. Africa Report No. 217.
- Sudan Tribune. (2011). South Sudan Investigates Grain Fraud Worth Billions of Dollars. 23 January 2011.
- United Nations Security Council. (2015). Report on the Current State of Armed Groups in South Sudan. Security Council Document S/2015/656.
- United States Institute of Peace and Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. (2006). Sudan Experience Project: Interview on Security Sector Reform. Interview dated 28 June 2006.
- Sudan Tribune. (2012). South Sudan’s Minister of Justice Instructed to Prosecute Corrupt Officials. Reporting on the Dura investigations and public procurement allegations.


